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Abstract
While other philosophers have pointed out that Libet’s
experiment is compatible with compatibilist free will and
also with some kinds of libertarian free will, this article ar-
gues that it is even compatible with strong libertarian free
will, i.e. a person’s ability to initiate causal processes. It
is widely believed that Libet’s experiment has shown that
all our actions have preceding unconscious causes. This
article argues that Libet’s claim that the actions he invest-
igated are voluntary is false. They are urges, and there-
fore the experiment shows at most that our urges have
preceding unconscious causes, which is what also strong
libertarianism leads us to expect. Further, Libet’s correct
∗International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechten-
stein, http://von-wachter.de, email: epostATvon-wachter.de. This research
was carried out at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in project
Fondecyt 1100608 funded by the Chilean institution Conicyt.
2
observation that we can veto urges undermines his claim
that our actions are initiated unconsciously and supports
the thesis that we have strong libertarian free will.
Keywords: libertarian free will, Libet, neuroscience,
urges
1 Introduction
It is widely believed that Benjamin Libet’s experiment1 has
shown that our actions are caused by our brain before we even
think about them. There is still a lively discussion about Libet’s
experiment.2 Compatibilists (like Gomes 1999 and Schlosser
2012) believe that an action’s being free is compatible with its
being the result of a causal process and that the reasons for an ac-
tion (or the beliefs in them) are amongst its causes. Therefore at
least for some compatibilists free will is compatible with Libet’s
experiment. Only the strongest libertarian notions of free will are
generally taken to be in conflict with Libet’s experiment. Some
philosophers defend free will against the evidence from neuros-
cience by saying: ‘Only a very old-fashioned, mysterious kind of
free will is incompatible with Libet’s experiment. Nobody would
defend that nowadays!’ Alfred Mele for example says:
Only a certain kind of mind-body (or ‘substance’) dualist
would hold that conscious intentions do not ‘arise as a
result of brain activity,’ and such dualist views are rarely
advocated in contemporary philosophical publications on
free will. (Mele 2009, p. 67)
1The experiment is described in Libet et al. 1982 and Libet et al. 1983.
Libet 1985 and Libet 1999 present Libet’s interpretation. In what follows
publication years refer to Libet’s articles unless specified otherwise.
2For example in Sinnott-Armstrong and Nadel 2011, Robinson 2012, Bat-
thyany 2009, Schlosser 2012, Bayne 2011.
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I hold this view that conscious intentions do not arise as a
result of brain activity; decisions are not the result of causal pro-
cesses. This view – strong libertarian free will, SLF – is the view
of free will which is most diﬃcult to reconcile with Libet’s exper-
iment and which was refuted by Libet’s experiment if any was.
SLF may be rarely advocated in contemporary philosophical pub-
lications, but in other centuries it was the majority view. In this
article I defend the compatibility between Libet’s experiment
with SLF by arguing that the actions which Libet investigated
were not voluntary in the sense required and may well have been
caused by preceding events, while other actions may be free.
I shall proceed by answering the following questions and de-
fending the following claims:
• What do I mean by ‘strong libertarian free will’?
• The events whose preceding unconscious causes Libet in-
vestigated (W) are not ‘intentions’ but ‘urges’.
• Libet deceived the readers through misusing the words ‘vol-
untary’ and ‘spontaneous’.
• What are urges? Given strong libertarian free will, urges
are to be expected to have preceding unconscious causes.
The actions which Libet investigated are irrelevant for the
question of free will.
• If we can veto urges, as Libet confirmed that we can, then
we have strong libertarian free will.
2 Strong libertarian free will (SLF)
(2.1) Let me state my view of free will. The causal process that
leads to the intended result of an action, such as a movement of
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the hand, I call the action process. If the action process was
under way before the person thought about the action and made
the decision, then the action was not free. In a free action the
action process has a beginning a part of which has no preceding
event cause, neither a deterministic nor an indeterministic one,
but its occurrence is due to the agent. It is an event that has
no preceding cause but is brought about directly by the agent. I
call such an event a choice event. Agents have the power to
make certain events pop up; through this they can initiate causal
processes. (Therefore my view can be called the ‘pop up view’
or the ‘initiation view’.)
(2.2) So there is a third way how an event can come about,
besides being the result of a deterministic process and being the
result of an indeterministic process. This is the denial of mechan-
icism, the view that every event has to be the result of a causal
process. Choice events are brought about by the agent in the
light of reasons or following inclinations, but reasons (or belief in
reasons) and inclinations are not event causes (or process causes,
or law-governed causes) of the actions. Only with an unusually
wide notion of ‘cause’, such as Aristotle’s notion aÊtÐa, one can
call a person’s belief in a reason for which he moved his hand
a ‘cause’ of the action or of the movement, but this relationship
between the belief and the movement is very diﬀerent from the
relationship to which we refer when we say that the earthquake
caused the tidal wave, or that the spark caused the explosion.
Here are three diﬀerences: First, we would not usually say that
the belief ‘brought about’ the movement. Rather, the person
brought about the movement, in the light of the reason in which
he believes. Second, the relationship is not governed by laws of
nature. Third, there is no causal process leading from the be-
lief to the movement. If there were, then the occurrence of the
belief at a certain time together with certain other facts would
be a complete cause of some event at each time after, so that
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this complete cause determines exactly which eﬀect will occur
at which time, if nothing intervenes; as the earthquake together
with certain other facts determines exactly at what time the tidal
wave will be where and how big.
(2.3) Whether we call the agent the ‘cause’ of the choice event,
as the defenders of agent causation do (Chisholm 1976, p. 201,
Clarke 1993, Swinburne 1997, p. 231), or say that the choice
event was ‘uncaused’ (Ginet 2007) does not matter here. That
is just a matter of how the word ‘cause’ is ordinarily used and
in how wide a sense we want to use it. What matters for our
discussion of the neuroscientific data is that a choice event has
no preceding cause and that the agent initiates a causal process.3
(2.4) So I endorse the view, which Mele claims to be rarely
defended today and to entail dualism, that actions do not arise
as a result of brain activity. But it requires not dualism but the
negation of mechanicism, i.e. the view that every event must be
the result of a (deterministic or indeterministic) causal process.
It does not require dualism because a materialist could claim
that some material things can bring about choice events. That
claim is not more diﬃcult to defend than the claim that some
material things can think or can act for reasons.4
(2.5) I call this notion of free will ‘strong’ libertarian free will
in order to distinguish it from Mele’s (2006, p. 10; 1995, pp. 211–
221) or Clarke’s (2000) ‘modest libertarianism’ or Clarke’s (1993)
‘credible agent-causal account of free will’. These views assume
that the action is caused by preceding events, but only indeterm-
inistically. Some hold that the process of deliberation must be
indeterministic (Mele 1995), some hold that the action itself must
3For more details see Wachter 2003 and Wachter 2009, ch. 7. Other authors
who claim that actions involve events that have no preceding cause are Ginet
(2007), Lowe (2008, p. 12), and Meixner (2004, ch. 9).
4Also Gomes (1999, p. 63) falsely assumes that denying that all brain
events are the results of purely material causal processes entails dualism.
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be caused indeterministically (Balaguer 2009), some say that the
undertaking the action was caused by the agent, wherefore they
call it ‘agent causation’, and that an action is free if the undertak-
ing has no preceding deterministic cause (Chisholm 1976, p. 201,
Swinburne 1997, p. 231).
(2.6) The trouble with these views is that randomness in the
action process always diminishes the agent’s control over the ac-
tion. It is true that if an action process were indeterministic,
then it would be in some sense true that it was possible, until
the action occurred, that another action would occur instead of
the one that did occur. In this sense it is true that the agent
could have acted diﬀerently. But this is not what we are getting
at when we say that a free agent ‘could have done otherwise’. If
it is a matter of chance which action occurs, then it is not up to
the agent what he does. An action that occurs by chance is not
a free action, because the agent lacks control over which action
occurs. If an action is the result of an indeterministic, chancy
process, then the agent has as little control over it as an agent
has over an action that occurs as the result of a deterministic
process.
(2.7) If Libet’s claim that in all actions ‘the volitional process
is [. . . ] initiated unconsciously’ (1999, p. 47) were true, then it
would not be initiated by a choice event. Therefore, there would
be no strong libertarian free will. I shall elaborate one argument
for the thesis that Libet has not provided evidence for his claim.
3 The popular interpretation of Libet’s experiment
The popular picture, which Libet spread himself when discuss-
ing free will (for example in 1999), goes like this.
In his experiment Libet told some test persons to move
their hand when they wanted to, ‘on her/his own initiat-
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ive’. (1999, p. 47) He wanted to know when the conscious
intention to act appears. Therefore he gave the test per-
sons a special clock and asked them to report the time
at which they were first aware of the intention. This first
awareness is referred to as ‘W’. At the same time he meas-
ured when the muscle activity and when a certain brain
event, the ‘readiness potential’ (RP), began. The result
was that W begins 200 ms (milliseconds) before muscle
activity, and RP begins 350 ms before W. Therefore ‘the
volitional process is [. . . ] initiated unconsciously’, before
the agent decided and before he even thought about the
action. (1999, p. 47)
I want to show now that the experiment does not support this
claim that the volitional process in free actions is initiated un-
consciously. Libet misdescribed the nature of W and investigated
the wrong kind of actions. While he liked to describe W as the
‘intention’, W is nothing but an urge. Elsewhere I have argued
that the RP does not cause W but is only a preparation to move,
but for the sake of the argument I put this issue aside here.
4 Libet’s seven labels of the conscious event W
(4.1) Thesis: Libet’s using many diﬀerent labels for Wmisleads
the reader to believe that the persons were entirely free in when
to move their hand, while in fact they were instructed to wait for
an urge.
(4.2) As already Mele (2007) and O’Connor (2009, p. 181) have
pointed out, Libet used many diﬀerent labels for W, apparently
randomly. Before listing the many labels which Libet used, I
want to point out which label was used in the instructions that
the test persons received. In the first few trials ‘the subject was
asked to wait [until the clock pointer had passed a certain point]
and then, at any time thereafter, when he felt like doing so, to
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perform the quick, abrupt flexion of the fingers and/or the wrist
of his right hand.’ (1982, p. 324) But for some reason, which
Libet does not describe, after some trials Libet introduced new
instructions. The test persons were instructed to ‘let the urge
to act [move their hand] appear on its own at any time without
any preplanning or concentration on when to act’. (1982, p. 324,
similarly 1983, p. 625) So, as already Batthyany (2009, p. 150)
has pointed out, the test persons were were told to wait for an
urge and to move their hand only when an urge arises. Here is a
further passage that shows this:
It was not uncommon for subjects to feel an urge to move
that was not consummated in an actual movement, as if
that urge was ‘vetoed,’ and then to wait for a new urge
that did lead to movement. (1982, p. 333)
(4.3) Now let us see what other labels Libet used. Already in
the title of the article from 1983 W is referred to as the ‘conscious
intention to act’. The label ‘intention’ is the label Libet used most
often.5 In the summary at the beginning of the article from 1983,
Libet refers to W with the phrase ‘the reportable time (W) for
appearance of the subjective experience of “wanting” or intending
to act’ (623). The word ‘urge’ is not mentioned in the summary
at all. It is first mentioned in the introduction in the phrase
‘conscious awareness of the voluntary urge or intention’ (624).
Why does Libet say ‘voluntary urge or intention’ where it would
be most obvious and most precise to say just ‘urge’?
(4.4) The quotation marks around ‘wanting’ are Libet’s. We
find them also around other labels of W. Their purpose may be
5For example, Libet called W an ‘intention’ in the title of Haggard and
Libet 2001, ‘Conscious Intention and Brain Activity’, and still in his last
article on free will he refers to W as ‘the urge or intention to perform a
voluntary act’. (Libet 2006, pp. 541, 543) Further occurrences of the label
‘intention’ for W: 1985, p. 532; Libet 1999, pp. 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55; Libet
2002, pp. 291, 292; Libet 2003b, pp. 322, 325; Libet 2006, pp. 541, 543, 545.
9
to indicate that the test persons used these phrases. But it is
not clear at what occasion they used them, because it is not
as if the test persons were told to move their hand whenever
they wanted to and then asked what it felt like. Libet himself
presented the experiment in later articles as if the instructions
had been thus when he writes that ‘the subject performed the
sudden flick of the wrist whenever he/she freely wanted to do so’
(1999, p. 50); but that is deceiving. The test persons were given
definite instructions to act only on an ‘urge’. Perhaps Libet used
the quotation marks in order to indicate that he uses the term
metaphorically or in a stretched sense or incorrectly. We can
only guess. He should have always used the term ‘urge’, because
that term was used in the instructions and that is what W is.
(4.5) At the end of the summary of the 1983 article we read
that the cerebral initiation of an action begins ‘before there is
any subjective awareness that a “decision” to act has already
been initiated cerebrally’ (623). (Again the quotation marks are
Libet’s.) The word ‘urge’ does not at all occur in the summary.
In the body of the article, where the nature of W is discussed,
we read:
The subject was asked to note and later report the time of
appearance of his conscious awareness of ‘wanting’ to per-
form a given self-initiated movement. The experience was
also described as an ‘urge’ or ‘intention’ or ‘decision’ to
move, though subjects usually settled for the words ‘want-
ing’ or ‘urge’. (1983, p. 627)
Here Libet says that the test persons used all these diﬀerent
terms, but it is not clear at what occasion they did and whether
this tells us something about the nature of the experience. Does
it mean that sometimes W was an urge, sometimes a decision,
and sometimes a intention? Or was W always all of these three?
(4.6) The next label for W we find in the phrase: ‘the sub-
jects reported that each urge or wish [Libet’s emphasis] to act
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appeared suddenly “out of nowhere”, with no specific preplan-
ning or preawareness that it was about to happen.’ (1983, p. 638,
similarly 1982, p. 329) 6
(4.7) Oddly, a further label for W is used in the page header of
the article from 1983 (and therefore on every page of the article),
which is never used in the body of the text: volition. The page
header is ‘Cerebral and Conscious Times of Volition’.
(4.8) So we now have six labels for W: (conscious) intention,
urge, wish, wanting, decision, volition. Fortunately, in Libet’s
later articles we find only one further label: ‘desire’ (1985, p. 530).7
Nowhere does Libet clarify any of the labels or discuss the nature
of event W. Clearly, not all these seven labels apply to any one
event, even if we stretch their ordinary meanings. Often Libet
added to the correct label ‘urge’ another label, e.g. ‘urge or de-
cision’ (1985, p. 530) or ‘urge or intention’ (1982, p. 329, 1983,
p. 624, and 2006, p. 541). It is of course true that ‘W is an urge
or a decision’, even though ‘W is a decision’ is false. But given
that, as I will explain, Libet’s claim that all our actions are initi-
ated unconsciously follows from the thesis that our decisions are
caused by RP, but not from the thesis that urges are caused by
RP, the diﬀerence between urge, decision, and the other labels
matters.
(4.9) Given that the test persons instructed to act on an urge,
did they actually move their hands on urges? Yes, but prob-
ably they were not very strong. The urges that motivated the
movements were not as strong as the urge of a thirsty man to
drink water or the urge of a cleptomanic woman to steal. Unless
6The label ‘wish’ is also found on p. 640 of 1983, p. 638, as well as in many
places in Libet’s later articles, e.g. 2003a, p. 24 and Libet 1999, pp. 49, 50,
51, 52, 53.
7‘Desire’ is used in 1983 too, but only in a general statement about ‘an
experience of conscious intention or desire to perform a voluntary act’ (640),
not specifically as a label of W.
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you suﬀer from hyperactivity, if you try to follow Libet’s instruc-
tions, only weak urges will arise and motivate the movements.
The urges in the experiment were resistable, which is why Libet
could instruct the persons to veto the urge. Further, the urges
were, besides being relatively weak, sudden and short. But still
they are rightly described as urges. I will analyse this in more
detail below.
5 How Libet used the words ‘spontaneously’ and
‘voluntary’
(5.1) Thesis: Libet’s calling the movements ‘spontanteous’,
‘self-initiated’, and ‘voluntary’ misleads the reader to believe that
the persons were entirely free in when to move their hand, while
in fact they were instructed to wait for an urge.
(5.2) The readiness potential had been discovered already by
Kornhuber and Deecke in 1965, who gave it the German name
‘Bereitschaftspotential’, which is used in neuroscience.8 They had
instructed their test persons to move their hand in time intervals
of 30 seconds. Libet et al. (1982) claimed to have removed this
constraint:
In our experiments, however, we removed this constraint
on freedom of action; subjects performed a simple flick
or flexion of the wrist at any time they felt the urge or
wish to do so. These voluntary acts were to be performed
capriciously, free of any external limitations or restrictions.
(1999, p. 49; similarly 1983, p. 624)
(5.3) In the first few trials ‘the subject was asked to wait [until
the clock pointer had passed a certain point] and then, at any
time thereafter, when he felt like doing so, to perform the quick,
8Cf. Jahanshahi and Hallet 2003 and Shibasaki and Hallett 2006.
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abrupt flexion of the fingers and/or the wrist of his right hand.’
(1982, p. 324, my emphasis) When discussing free will Libet often
suggested that the test persons were instructed thus to move
their hand whenever they wanted to; for example: ‘[T]he subject
performed the sudden flick of the wrist whenever he/she freely
wanted to do so.’ (1999, p. 50) But in fact after a few trials the
instructions were changed, and the results of the first trials were
left aside:
An additional instruction to encourage ‘spontaneity’ of the
act [was given to the test persons. . . . ] The subject was
instructed ‘to let the urge to act appear on its own at any
time without any pre-planning or concentration on when
to act,’ i.e. to try to be ‘spontaneous’ in deciding when
to perform each act; this instruction was designed to elicit
voluntary acts that were freely capricious in origin. (1982,
p. 324; similarly 1983, p. 625)
Why did Libet introduce these instructions after some trials?
He did not tell us, but presumably the reason was that some or
all test persons in the beginning acted just when they wanted
to, without an urge, and some thought about when to act, and
these trials did not produce the results that Libet was looking
for. Libet carefully designed the experiment so that the test
persons do not act whenever they want to or after some planning,
but wait for an urge. I will argue later that the diﬀerence is
relevant because Libet’s assumption that if the actions that he
investigated have preceding unconscious causes, then all do, is
true if the actions investigated are done whenever the person
wants to, but false if they are motivated by urges.
(5.4) So Libet called a hand movement following an urge, which
the test persons described as coming ‘out of nowhere’,9 more
9That the urges arose ‘out of nowhere’ is confirmed by 1982, p. 324 and
1983, p. 638.
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spontaneous than a hand movement which the person performs
whenever he wants to. That is misleading. He uses ‘spontaneous’
in the sense of ‘out of the blue’. Ordinary language is not entirely
clear here, but normally by a spontaneous action one means an
action that has not been planned but that the person does out of
a spontaneous decision. If somebody moves his hand out of an
urge, we would rather not call that ‘spontaneous’, because the
action was not initiated by his decision. The impuls came upon
him from outside.
(5.5) Further, Libet misleadingly called the hand movements
‘self-initiated’.10 A ‘self-initiated’ action is one which the person
does without being pushed to do it. The person himself initiates
it. But in fact the movements which Libet called ‘self-initiated’
were not self-initiated, because the test persons were asked to
wait for an urge.
(5.6) The movements in Libet’s experiment were not as in-
voluntary as an alcoholic’s drinking, because the urge did not
greatly weaken the will. Therefore, as Libet emphasized himself,
the persons were free to resist the urge. But Libet’s calling the
hand movements ‘voluntary’ and calling W rarely an urge but
using the labels listed above misleads the reader to believe that
the test persons were instructed to move their hand whenever
they want to and to overlook the fact that the test persons were
instructed to wait for an urge. The movements were voluntary
in that the persons agreed to participate in the experiment and
in that they did not veto the urge, but they were not voluntary
in the sense of being self-initiated actions, be it in the light of
reasons or just whenever the person decides to move. Therefore
it is misleading that Libet called the hand movements ‘voluntary’.
10Places where Libet calls the investigated movements ‘self-initiated’: Libet
et al. 1982, pp. 322, 324, 325; Libet et al. 1983, pp. 623, 624, 625, 627; Libet
1999, pp. 48, 51; Haggard and Libet 2001, p. 57.
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He did so all the time, and in his articles from 1982, 1983, and
1985 he used the word ‘voluntary’ even in the title.
(5.7) Did Libet perhaps use the term ‘voluntary’ in an unusual
way? No, the definition he provided reinforces his claim that the
hand movements were as free as any action:
In this experimental investigation and its analysis an act
is regarded as voluntary and a function of the subject’s
will when (a) it arises endogenously, not in direct response
to an external stimulus or cue; (b) there are no externally
imposed restrictions or compulsions that directly or imme-
diately control subjects’ initiation and performance of the
act; and (c) most important, subjects feel introspectively
that they are performing the act on their own initiative
and that they are free to start or not to start the act as
they wish. (1985, p. 529)
Clearly, the hand movements in Libet’s experiment, contrary
to his claims, do not fulfill condition (c), because the test per-
sons did not move their hand on their own initiative but on an
urge, and because Libet had instructed them to move their hand
not whenever they wanted to, but when an urge arises. So also
according to Libet’s own definition of ‘voluntary’, it was wrong
that he called the hand movements voluntary.
(5.8) Libet emphasized that the movements investigated were
‘spontaneous’, ‘self-initiated’, and ‘voluntary’ in order to make
the readers believe that the actions investigated are free if any are
free, and are not initiated by the brain if any are. Note the word
‘even’ in the following quotation: ‘Cerebral initiation even [!] of
a spontaneous voluntary act of the kind studied here can and
usually does begin unconsciously.’ (1985, p. 536 l) That is to say,
the actions investigated were as free as any, and therefore all our
actions are initiated unconsciously.
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6 What is an urge?
(6.1) In order to examine whether Libet’s experiment provides
evidence against SLF, we need to investigate the nature of the
urges in Libet’s experiment and consider which outcome of Libet’s
experiment does strong libertarianism us lead to expect. I shall
now argue that, according to SLF, an urge to move one’s hand
may well have preceding unconscious causes, while other actions
do not have preceding unconscious causes, and that therefore
Libet’s experiment provides no evidence for the claim that our
voluntary actions are caused unconsciously and that we thus have
no libertarian free will.
(6.2) An urge, like the one in the actions Libet investigated, is
a kind of motivation of an action. Reasons are a diﬀerent kind of
motivation. I might eat your steak out of an urge while having,
and believing in, overriding reasons for not doing so because the
steak is your property. On the other hand, I might do something
for which I have no urge at all, but to the contrary an urge not
to do it or an aversion against doing it. I am then acting on
the reasons, against my urge. Of course, there are also actions
towards which the agent has an urge and for which he has over-
riding reasons, for example when a mother has an urge to protect
her child.
(6.3) A reason for an action is something that the person can
consider in his mind and then act in the light of it. He has a belief
that there is this reason, and the content of that belief motivates
him. The content of the belief is that the situation requires this
action from him, or that a certain aspect of the situation speaks
in favour of this action, whether he likes it or not. The agent is
active, he takes action in response to the reason.
(6.4) By contrast, an urge is something that pushes the agent
16
towards a certain action. The agent is passive11, he finds him-
self being pushed by the urge. No reflection, consideration, or
decision is required for the action. The agent need not believe
in reasons for the action. While in motivation through reasons
a belief or its content motivates the agent, motivation through
urges involves no beliefs. The agent is being pushed towards the
action. Additional to the urge the agent might have a belief in
reasons for the action, or that he ought not to do it, but the urge
can exist without such beliefs.
(6.5) Urges diminish the degree of freedom which the person
has in that situation. How free a person is depends on how how
many urges he has and how strong they are, how strong his power
to resist them is, and how much possibility he has over time to
weaken his urges and to develop resistance to them.
(6.6) Do urges have preceding unconscious complete event causes?
That is, is there already before the urge a causal process towards
it under way of which the person is not aware? The answer is
that this need not be so but it may well be. I say ‘may well’
because the urge might occur through probabilistic processes or
at random so that one might say that it has no preceding causes.
There are two ways how an urge can lead to an action, one with,
the other without a choice event. (A) An urge could be an in-
clination to produce a certain choice event. (B) An urge could
consist in a causal process which the person could stop but which
carries on if the person follows the urge. In this case, although
the person sometimes brings about choice events, in these actions
there are none. There may well be both cases. Let us consider
both possibilities.
(6.7) In case (A) there is a choice event, but before it occurs,
11That agents are passive with respect to urges and desires and active with
respect to reasons has also been brought out by Batthyany 2009, p. 13 and
Lowe 2008, ch. 9.
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the agent feels an urge towards making that choice. Given the
assumption that choice events have no preceding cause, the rela-
tion between the feeling of urge and the choice event is not one
of event or process causation. Perhaps in a wider sense of ‘cause’
it can be called a ‘cause’, but not in the sense of event or process
causation. It will be some relation sui generis, we do not need to
investigate it further here. However, the feeling of urge may well
have complete causes that occur when the person has not even
thought about the action. More precisely, in that case there is at
a time before the urge a complete cause of the urge of no part of
which the person is aware and no part of which is identical with
or associated with a thought about the action. This complete
cause is a stage of a process which leads to the urge in one of
several ways, depending on which theory of the mental is true.
For example, first, in accordance with the identity theory of the
mental, the feeling of urge may be identical with a stage of this
process or a part of it. Or, second, the feeling of urge may be not
identical with a physical event but in some other way associated
with one. Or, third, the feeling of urge may be not dependent on
a physical event.
In any of these version of (A) an urge may have unconscious
preceding causes. So the RP may be a part of a complete cause
of the urge W. That would not be evidence against SLF.
(6.8) In case (B) there is no choice event, but just a causal
process leading to, or rather heading towards, the hand move-
ment. At some stage a corresponding feeling of urge arises. This
mental event might be identical with some physical event that is
a part of the causal process, or might be epiphenomenal in that
it is caused by the process but does not itself cause the hand
movement. The process begins already before the urge. So there
is already before the urge a complete cause of the urge and of the
hand movement. If the person has strong libertarian free will in
this situation, then he has the power to stop the process by bring-
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ing about as choice event some event which is incompatible with
an event towards which the process was heading. He can resist
the urge by vetoing the process and the urge. But the possibility
of vetoing does not require that the process is probabilistic. It
just needs to be stoppable.
Also in case (B) an urge may have unconscious preceding
causes. So the RP may be a part of a complete cause of the
urge W. That would not be evidence against SLF.
(6.9) I conclude that according to SLF, W, because it is an urge,
may well have preceding unconscious causes and that Libet’s
experiment therefore does not provide evidence against strong
libertarian free will. None at all. Libet’s assumption that if the
actions investigated were initiated unconsciously, then all are, is
false.12
7 If we can veto, we are free
(7.1) Finally I want to argue that one of the experiment’s res-
ults that we have not yet considered provides evidence in favour
of free will. Libet claimed that all our actions are initiated uncon-
sciously by the RP before our first thought about the action, but
he added that we can consciously intervene and stop a process
heading towards a certain action. ‘The existence of a veto pos-
sibility is not in doubt.’ (1999, p. 52) He presents two arguments
12Thus I agree with Roskies (2011, p. 20): ‘Libet’s studies definitely impact
our understanding our understanding of only a small number of our actions,
and these appear to be the ones that are least likely to matter for discus-
sions of freedom.’ Also O’Connor 2009, 181f states that the actions ‘are not
prototypical spontaneous conscious willings’, because they are not spontan-
eous and the instruction to wait for an urge ‘encourages a passive posture’.
I disagree with Bayne (2011, § 3), who accepts that the actions in Libet’s
experiment ‘provide the free will sceptic with a legitimate target.’ That the
experiment provides no argument against free will because W is an urge has
also been pointed out by Batthyany 2009, 150 f.
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for this: First, some test persons ‘reported that during some of
the trials a recallable conscious urge to act appeared but was
’aborted‘ or somehow suppressed before any actual movement
occurred.’ (1985, § 4.1) Second, Libet conducted an experiment
(Libet et al. 1983) where test persons were instructed to plan to
move their hand at a certain time but ‘to veto the developing
intention/preparation to act and to do this about 100 to 200 ms
before the prearranged clock time at which they were otherwise
supposed to act.’ (1985, § 4.1) The vetoing was possible. An RP
began 1 second before the pre-set time. At the moment when
the person vetoed, it was flattened or reversed. ‘The veto find-
ings suggest that preparatory cerebral processes can be blocked
consciously just prior to their consummation in actual motor out-
flow.’
(7.2) Mele has suggested that Libet’s description of what is
vetoed as ‘intended motor action’ is mistaken because one cannot
have an intention to flex and an intention not to flex. (Mele 2009,
p. 52 The solution is that the movement was motivated by an
urge. One can wait for an urge to move ones hand and then veto,
i.e. resist it.
(7.3) Libet’s claim of the possibility of vetoing undermines his
claim that all our actions are the result of unconscious processes.
Consider how vetoing can work. First, that vetoing is possible
proves that the process from the urge towards the movement is
stoppable. If it were Hobbesian-deterministic, vetoing would be
impossible. Now, is the vetoing a result of a causal process?
Libet, rightly in my view, suggests that it is not:
[T]he conscious veto may not require or be the direct result
of preceding unconscious processes. The conscious veto is
a control function, diﬀerent from simply becoming aware
of the wish to act. There is no logical imperative in any
mind-brain theory, even identity theory, that requires spe-
cific neural activity to precede and determine the nature
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of a conscious control function. And, there is no exper-
imental evidence against the possibility that the control
process may appear without development by prior uncon-
scious processes. (1999, p. 53)
(7.4) Libet’s experiment suggest that the vetoing is not the
result of preceding processes, because there is before the vetoing
the same RP than in cases without veto. So the RP does not
cause the veto. Furthermore, our experience suggests that we
sometimes have urges, that we can sometimes resist them, and
that some of our actions are not following urges but are initiated
by us. We experience the urges as pushing us so that they may
well be the results of causal processes. But if we resist an urge, we
experience our vetoing as being our decision without this being
the result of causal processes.
(7.5) How does the vetoing work? The only possibility how a
person can veto an urge is that he brings about an event which is
incompatible with the process that is directed towards the action.
If the vetoing is not the result of preceding unconscious processes,
then this event, the intervention-event, is a choice event. So we
have the ability to bring about choice events. But if we have
that ability, then it is unlikely that we can use it only for vetoing
and not also for initiating action processes. So Libet’s correct
observation that we can veto urges undermines his false claim
that all our actions are the result of unconscious processes. I
conclude that Libet’s experiment provides no evidence against
strong libertarian free will because the movements investigated
were not initiated by free decision but by urges, and that the
occurrence of vetoing is evidence for us having the power to bring
about choice events and thus for strong libertarian free will.
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